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The Effect of Timeliness and Credit Ratings on the Information Content of 
Earnings Announcements 
 
 
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the impact of timeliness and credit ratings on the 
information content of the earnings announcements of Greek listed firms for a period spanning 
from 2001 to 2008. Using both the classical event study methodology and regression analysis, 
we find that firms tend to release “good news” on time and are inclined to delay “bad news”. 
We also provide evidence that the level of corporate risk differentiates the information content of 
earnings according to the credit rating category. Specifically, firms displaying high 
creditworthiness enjoy positive excess returns on earnings announcement dates. In contrast, 
firms with low creditworthiness undergo significant share price erosions on earnings 
announcement days. We also observe a substitution effect between timeliness and credit ratings 
in relation to the information content of earnings announcements. Thus, we find that as the credit 
ratings of earnings-announcing firms improve, the informational role of timeliness is mitigated.  
 
Keywords: Earnings announcements, credit ratings, timeliness, information asymmetry, Athens 
Stock Exchange. 
JEL Classification Codes: G14; G15 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate events that transmit management expectations and private information to investors 
have been at the epicenter of market participant interest for several decades. The release of 
financial results remains one of the most puzzling features in accounting and finance research. 
Their importance is evident from the behavior of market participants such as managers, 
shareholders, investors, auditors and public authorities.  Earnings disclosures have been proven 
to attract much media coverage, cause financial analysts to revise their estimations and to 
rejuvenate investor interest in capital markets. Since the seminal papers of Beaver (1968) and 
Ball and Brown (1968), who probed into the effects of earnings announcements on share prices, 
a strand of studies has attempted to disentangle the information content of financial results. 
Considering the timing of managers’ decisions to release these results, prior research suggests 
that the dissemination of “bad news” tends to be delayed until it becomes unavoidable (e.g., 
Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Kothari et al., 2009; Crabtree and 
Kubick, 2014), while the acceleration of “good news” is to be expected. According to Crabtree 
and Kubick (2014), several theories have been propounded in the literature to construe the “good 
news early, bad news late” hypothesis, including: (i) proprietary reporting costs (Verrecchia, 
1983); (ii) the desire to widen the time interval before disclosing “bad news” (Doyle and 
Magilke, 2009); and (iii) long horizon-related career concerns (Kothari et al., 2009). Thus, 
managers strategically decide on the release of “news” by considering the costs related to 
competitors’ reaction and litigation (Verrecchia, 1983), information dissemination strategies 
regarding media and investor attention (Doyle and Magilke, 2009), and career implications (e.g., 
compensation and employment opportunities [Kothari et al., 2009]). 
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Although the role of earnings disclosures has been extensively examined, it still remains 
a first order issue for many academics, investors and managers in the wake of increasingly 
opportunistic earnings management and the subsequent decline in accounting information quality 
(Jorion et al., 2009). The effect of the increase in earnings management has been the decline in 
the  credibility of financial statements. As a result, an increasing number of investors and 
financial analysts have been looking for alternative channels of corporate information, such as 
credit ratings. Credit ratings transmit sensitive information to investors and financial markets 
beyond other publicly available information (Ederington and Goh, 1998; Jorion et al., 2005; 
Tang, 2009) since they provide assessments of a firm’s financial creditworthiness for the 
foreseeable future. Moreover, credit rating agencies uncover qualitative information through due 
diligence processes and private communications with firm managers (Chou, 2013). Therefore, 
credit ratings include private forward-looking information that can be used by investors to better 
evaluate earnings news. 
While credit ratings are commonly employed for assessing the creditworthiness of issuers 
of government and corporate bonds, there is an ongoing criticism regarding the accuracy of the 
ratings, their reputation, their incremental value and the credibility of their announcements1 
(Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Boot et al., 2006; Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009; Mathis et al., 2009; 
Mariano, 2012). These criticisms are particularly true within the European Union (EU), where 
the operations of credit rating agencies have been severely criticized and are currently under 
review by the EU parliament (Mackenzie, 2012). Nevertheless, credit ratings are considered a 
valuable source of corporate information by market participants. An and Chan (2008) argue that 
credit ratings assist in disseminating important information regarding firm value to uninformed 
investors and for that reason they reduce information asymmetry in financial markets. Boot et al. 
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(2006) analytically show that credit rating agencies create information that accelerates the 
dissemination of private information to the market. On the basis of their analysis, we argue that 
credit ratings can also speed up the announcement of earnings in cases where the conveyed 
information heads in the same direction (e.g., “good news” for net income and creditworthiness). 
However, these supplementary effects may diverge when the two signals point in different 
directions. In this case, a substitution effect might be present since the role of credit ratings may 
alleviate the informational role of earnings announcements and vice versa. 
Motivated by the studies of Liu and Malatesta (2006) and An and Chang (2008) that 
investigated respectively the informational role of corporate credit ratings around seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) and initial public offerings (IPOs), we extend the literature by examining 
the effects of corporate credit ratings on the information content of the earnings announcements 
of Greek listed firms. Additionally, we examine whether credit rating changes are informative 
with respect to the reaction of a firm’s share price to the disclosure of its financial results. 
Finally, we explore the interrelationship between a firm’s credit ratings and the timeliness of 
earnings announcements (i.e., the length of time between the actual earnings announcement date 
and the last fiscal year-end). This will help us to detect any possible supplementary or 
substitution effect of the two channels of corporate information. 
Our interest in assessing the impact of credit ratings on earnings announcements is 
justified by the following three reasons. First, credit ratings appear to influence managerial 
decision-making. Specifically, managers adjust corporate capital structure based on credit rating 
levels (Kisgen, 2006). Consequently, credit ratings affect a company’s level of debt, interest 
payments, profitability, and financial stability. Credit ratings also affect corporate operations. For 
example, long-term supply contracts may require firms to maintain a specific credit rating at the 
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expense of growth and future profitability (Bosch and Steffen, 2011). Second, credit ratings play 
a significant role in the investment decisions of institutional investors (Bosch and Steffen, 2011). 
Credit rating agencies certify the quality of the borrower (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) and 
regulations may require investment only in highly-rated securities (Bosch and Steffen, 2011). 
Moreover, prior evidence shows that credit ratings influence market prices and thus capital gains 
(Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982; Yi and Mullineaux 2006; Hand et al., 1992; Tang, 2009). Third, 
“firms having higher level and lower variability of future earnings enjoy high credit ratings 
which enable the market to capitalize more future earnings news” (Chou, 2013, p. 218). 
Therefore, relevant decisions on credit ratings are expected to affect the informational content of 
earnings disclosures and provide strong signals about corporate issues to market participants. 
To investigate the interactive effects of timeliness and credit ratings on the information 
content of earnings announcements, we employ data from firms listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) during the period of 2001-2008. Two remarkable events took place in Greece 
during this period that make it worthwhile a subject of an empirical study. First, following the 
European Commission’s Financial Services (ECFS) 1999 directive on quarterly financial 
reporting, the Greek stock market regulator, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (HCMC), 
has directed Greek firms to make financial reports public on a quarterly basis since 2000. This 
directive on quarterly financial reporting was expected to reduce information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors in Greece. Informed investors consist of insiders 
and institutional owners who possess privy information about a firm’s financial status and 
operations. Insiders are actively involved in managing the firm and so they rely less on financial 
statements to derive information regarding corporate events (Tzovas, 2006). Institutional 
investors, while not having the same access to private information compared to insiders, can 
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create an informational advantage through their ability to expend more resources on gathering 
and processing information about companies (Amihud and Li, 2002). Through quarterly 
financial reporting the information gap between informed and uninformed investors shrinks as 
long as more corporate information is released and less non-public information is withheld. So 
new information is beneficial to uninformed investors but also to informed ones since it provides 
a basis for the latter group to verify their expectations and prior projections. As a result, more 
accurate financial projections are launched by equity analysts that may help both informed and 
uninformed investors to better evaluate a firm’s future prospects. 
Second, during the period under investigation, Greek financial reporting practices were 
blamed for excessive earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003; Garcia-Osma and Pope, 2011) 
and fraudulent reporting practices (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). While several measures to 
restore investor confidence were initiated, such as the establishment of a new Oversight Board in 
2003 and the early application of IFRSs under the Law 2992/2002, the local press and interviews 
with investment bankers revealed that investors in Greece used alternative channels other than 
annual reports to glean corporate information (including credit ratings and analyst 
recommendations). Hence, Greece provides an interesting setting for testing the informational 
role of credit ratings in association with earnings announcement releases. To isolate the effect of 
the country’s sovereign debt crisis, which severely affected corporate creditworthiness and 
profitability, we focus our attention on the period just prior to the debt crisis, when market 
participants evaluated company fundamentals and corporate announcements without serious 
behavioral biases. 
Our findings suggest that timeliness is a significant factor in making earnings 
announcements value-relevant, lending support to the “good news early, bad news late” 
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hypothesis. In particular, firms that announce their earnings early experience positive excess 
returns, while firms announcing their earnings late undergo negative abnormal returns. The 
informativeness of earnings announcements becomes stronger when the early announcements 
contain positive earnings news. When the role of credit ratings is considered in our analysis, we 
find that the level of credit quality magnifies the value relevance of earnings announcements, 
especially when these contain positive earnings news and are released on a more timely basis. 
We also find an asymmetric market reaction to credit rating downgrades and upgrades, with the 
former inducing a stronger market reaction compared to the latter, and this reaction becomes 
even stronger when changes in credit ratings are congruent with changes in earnings (i.e., 
upgrades with positive earnings, downgrades with negative earnings). Finally, we empirically 
demonstrate a substitution effect between timeliness and credit ratings in relation to the 
information content of earnings announcements. Specifically, the informational role of timeliness 
is mitigated in cases of highly-rated firms, while for middle or low-rated firms it is magnified. 
Our research contributes to the ongoing debate over earnings announcements in several 
ways. First, although the market reaction to earnings releases is well documented, the effects of 
credit ratings on the informational role of financial reports have not been directly examined 
before. Jiang (2008) was the first to investigate whether beating earnings benchmarks reduces the 
cost of debt, as proxied by credit ratings. However, our study differs from that of Jiang (2008) in 
that we examine the role of credit ratings in transmitting credible information to investors. 
Second, this is the first study that tests the role of timeliness in association with credit ratings. 
This allows us to investigate possible concurrent or opposing effects between the two sources of 
share price variation. The results show that the two effects relate to substitution rather than being 
complementary. Third, given the scant evidence regarding the role of credit ratings in equity 
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markets, the current study highlights the importance of credit ratings as an alternative conduit of 
information for both informed and uninformed investors.  The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data 
and research methods employed. The results are presented and discussed in section 4, while 
section 5 presents the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Timeliness of Financial Reporting 
Timeliness of financial reporting has been recognized as an important qualitative characteristic 
of accounting information and, as a consequence, has been included as an element of many 
conceptual frameworks for financial reporting (Epstein and Jermakowich, 2007). In May 1999, 
the ECFS advocated for quarterly reporting which eventually led to the EU’s Transparency 
Directive (Directive No. 2004/109/EC). This Directive requires firms listed in the EU member 
states to report their financial performance and liquidity, among other things, on a quarterly 
basis. However, the EU did not mandate quarterly reporting, but rather encouraged voluntary 
adoption which, in effect, left it to each member state to decide whether to require firms in their 
respective countries to report on a quarterly or semiannual basis, considering the trade-off of 
costs and benefits involved. As a consequence, each member state was at liberty to set its own 
rules regarding the content of quarterly financial statements and whether to require firms to 
release financial reports for the first and third quarters (Alves and Dos Santos, 2008). This led to 
a situation where some EU member states (such as Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and Sweden) require quarterly reporting, while others (such as Denmark, France and 
Germany) do not. 
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The Greek market regulator, the HCMC, requires all listed firms in the country to release 
their annual earnings in the first three months after the financial year-end and to release interim 
earnings within two months after the end of each quarter. According to Chen et al. (2005), the 
time constraint for the announcement of earnings can create time pressure resulting in a 
heterogeneous market reaction. In fact, while the business press has provided many cases of the 
delayed announcement of “bad news”2, the extant academic literature has propounded several 
managerial incentives for withholding the release of negative financial results (“bad news”) for 
various reasons. First, in the absence of an opportunity to hide “bad news” due to regulatory 
restrictions, managers will delay an announcement in the hope that it will filter slowly into stock 
prices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Indeed, Doyle and Makilge (2009) provide evidence 
suggesting that “bad news” is released with some delay and that the market disseminates such 
information more broadly. Second, if managerial performance evaluation is related to earnings, 
managers will delay “bad news” to buy time in order to prepare a plan to respond to critics 
(Laurie and Pastena, 1975; Kross, 1981; 1982; Bowen et al., 1992). Alternatively, or probably 
additionally, managers delay “bad news” in order to gain more time to prepare a plan to reverse 
the poor performance (see Begley and Fischer, 1998). Third, managers may withhold “bad news” 
in the hope that over the next period some other favorable corporate events will occur to 
overshadow or obscure the negative information contained in the negative earnings 
announcement (Verrechia, 1983). Finally, career concerns can motivate managers to withhold 
“bad news” and gamble that subsequent events will allow them to “bury” it (see Kothari et al., 
2009). Career concerns broadly encompass the implications of news on management 
compensation, promotion, employment opportunities within and outside the firm, and board 
interlocks (ibid.). 
 11 
Indeed, prior studies provide ample empirical evidence to support the “good news early – 
bad news late” hypothesis (see Pastena and Ronen, 1979; Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Chambers 
and Penman, 1984; Begley and Fischer, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Leventis and Weetman, 
2004; Kothari et al., 2009). Haw et al. (2000) demonstrate that withholding “bad news” causes a 
gradual decline in stock prices, which is less costly to managers vis-à-vis a sharp fall in stock 
prices. Dye and Sridhar (1995) find that managers delay the release of “bad news” until 
favorable industry-wide news is announced. Based on theoretical propositions and empirical 
results, we expect firms that accelerate the publication of earnings to experience a share price 
appreciation, while those that delay the release of earnings will encounter firm value erosion. 
Moreover, we conjecture that the positive content (“good news”) of financial reports provokes 
strong positive abnormal returns, while the negative (“bad news”) content of earnings produces 
significant value losses. On the basis of the above discussion, we anticipate that firms that 
combine early announcements with “good content” bring about a considerable positive market 
reaction, whereas firms that delay the release of “bad news” suffer significant share price losses. 
Thus, our first hypotheses is as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with “good news” that accelerate the disclosure of earnings experience 
a positive abnormal market reaction, while those with “bad news” that delay the release of 
earnings experience a negative abnormal market reaction. 
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2.2 Importance of Credit Ratings 
The role of credit ratings is pivotal in financial markets. A strand of studies has examined the 
impact of credit ratings on the debt market, suggesting that credit rating agencies: (i) certify the 
quality of the borrower (Megginson and Weiss, 1991); (ii) impact on the cost of debt (Whited, 
1992; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997); (iii) lessen credit constraints which enables rated firms to 
raise more debt capital (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006); (iv) impact on managerial decisions 
regarding corporate capital structure (Kisgen, 2009); and (v) increase the magnitude of 
syndicated loans, which enables firms to finance new investments and acquisitions (Sufi, 2009). 
It has been suggested that the role of credit ratings in equity markets is comparable to that 
of debt markets (Chou, 2013). The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, credit ratings consider all 
publicly-available information. Aman and Nguyen (2013, p. 15) demonstrate that greater 
disclosure and transparency of earnings impacts on the accuracy of the rating. Secondly, credit 
ratings convey private information about the success of a firm’s projects and probable future 
prospects that is not available to equity analysts (Ederington et al., 1987; Chou, 2013) and, 
therefore, they generate information that speeds up the divulgence of private information to the 
market (Boot et al., 2006). Such information is considered relevant to decision-making since 
credit rating agencies have the power to gather confidential non-public information which 
managers may hesitate to disclose publicly for reasons of proprietary costs (Kisgen, 2009). 
Indeed, Chou (2013) demonstrates that credit rating agencies are less biased in their firm 
evaluation and information disclosure compared to equity analysts (whose incentives are linked 
to the investment banking business). 
To some extent, credit ratings determine the success of a firm (Mariano, 2012), since a 
bad credit rating increases the cost of debt which can damage the firm (Kliger and Sarig, 2000). 
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Furthermore, downgrades (upgrades) in credit ratings can lead to significant negative (positive) 
effects on stock and bond returns (Hand et al., 1992). This is because institutional investors (e.g., 
broker-dealers, banks, insurance firms, pension funds etc.) are required or encouraged to invest 
in securities that receive acceptable ratings (White, 2002). Additionally, herding behavior has 
been suggested to be associated with credit rating decisions, particularly in markets where 
information asymmetry is pronounced (Mariano, 2012). Thus, corporate managers target credit 
ratings in making capital structure decisions (Kisgen, 2006; 2007). 
While the information content of credit rating announcements has been well documented 
by prior studies (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Dichev and 
Piotroski, 2001) there is a paucity of evidence regarding the role of credit ratings in predicting 
the market reaction surrounding the release of new information3. For example, Liu and Malatesta 
(2006) and An and Chan (2008) explored the informational role of credit ratings surrounding 
SEOs and IPOs respectively and found that issuing firms with credit ratings encounter less 
underpricing that those without credit ratings. More recently, Chou (2013) examined whether 
credit ratings help stock prices to reflect more future earnings using the future earnings response 
coefficient model. In this study, we go a step further by assessing the effect of credit ratings4 on 
the information content of financial reports. We opt for analyzing this effect for a number of 
reasons. First, credit ratings affect the profitability of firms through interest payments. Firms 
with low credit quality face difficulties in raising funds through debt issue and, if they are able to 
raise funds, they normally do so at higher costs. Second, credit ratings determine the access to 
debt and equity markets and thus have a direct impact on a firm’s capital structure (Faulkender 
and Petersen, 2006). Third, credit ratings are considered to be selective channels of corporate 
information for both informed and uninformed investors (Jorion et al., 2005). This becomes more 
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evident in cases where firms enjoy high credit ratings which make them more transparent in 
terms of information disclosure compared with those with low credit ratings. The transparency is 
linked to a reduced amount of information asymmetry (Liu and Malatesta, 2006; DeBoskey and 
Gillet, 2013; Chou, 2013) which helps investors to better decode the information content of 
earnings releases. Based on the above, we conjecture that if firms with high creditworthiness 
enjoy a lower cost of debt, reduced information asymmetry, more transparency and a low 
probability of default (as suggested by prior literature), they will announce more favorable 
information through earnings releases which will be reflected in share prices. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the higher a firm’s credit rating, the better the information content of its 
earnings and the stronger the market reaction to the announcement of its earnings. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Our sample consists of 258 ASE-listed firms which have data on our test variables over the 
eight-year period, 2001-2008. We hand-collected the earnings announcement dates of these firms 
from daily financial press releases and the ASE website. We define the earnings announcement 
date as the date that an annual or quarterly financial report is made public. We extracted data on 
earnings (net income) for each sample firm from Thomson One. We also obtained daily-adjusted 
closing stock prices from DataStream to estimate the abnormal share price behavior around 
earnings announcement dates. Data for each firm’s credit ratings were obtained from Amadeus. 
We excluded financial sector firms (i.e. banking, insurance, investment, and leasing firms) from 
our sample due to the unavailability of credit ratings. 
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Following the classification of the Amadeus credit ratings system, we identified four 
discernible groups of firms based on their creditworthiness, namely “healthy firms”, “balanced 
firms”, “vulnerable firms” and “risky firms”. The “healthy firms” enjoy ratings between AAA 
and A levels (highly-rated). Firms in this group have the capacity to meet their financial 
commitments. They are notably strong, creditworthy and are highly solvent. The second group 
(“balanced firms”) consists of firms with credit ratings between BBB and BB. Though the capital 
structure of these firms is considered adequate, they are likely to face some ongoing uncertainties 
or exposure to adverse business and economic conditions. The third group of firms (“vulnerable 
firms”) consists of firms with credit ratings between B and CCC. Firms in this group are 
vulnerable as their fundamentals are weak and more susceptible to adverse market events. The 
fourth group of firms (“risky firms”) contains credit ratings between CC and D. In this group 
firms display high vulnerability, a low capacity to meet financial commitments and a high 
probability of insolvency. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the characteristics of each 
group of firms. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Initially, we identified 4,290 earnings announcement dates during the examination 
period. To avoid the problem of thin trading5 (i.e., stocks that trade infrequently), we excluded 
firms that had not had any share transactions for more than 100 days. We also excluded firms 
with missing data on net income and credit ratings. We mitigate the effect of outliers by deleting 
observations that are in the top or bottom 1.5%6 of the distribution of abnormal returns as well as 
unexpected earnings. The final sample consists of 2,443 announcement dates, of which 635 are 
annual earnings announcements, 619 first quarter earnings announcements, 602 semi-annual 
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earnings announcements, and 587 third quarter earnings announcements. Panel A of Table 2 
reports the sample distribution for each quarter and year examined. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Panel B of Table 2 displays the yearly distribution of earnings announcements according to the 
credit rating categories of the firms in the sample. The group of firms with a “balanced” credit 
rating has the highest number of earnings announcements (1,660 observations), followed by the 
group of “vulnerable” firms (384 observations), and then by the “healthy” group of firms (347 
observations). The group classified as “risky” has the least number of observations (52 
observations). Panel C of Table 2 shows the number of credit rating upgrades and downgrades 
that occurred during the period under examination. About 42% (364) of the firms had their credit 
ratings upgraded, while 58% (428) had their credit ratings downgraded. In addition, Panel C 
presents the cardinal size of credit rating upgrades and downgrades. We define the cardinal size 
of a credit rating as the difference between the cardinal value of a new rating and that of an old 
rating. Following Jorion et al. (2005), we convert credit ratings into cardinal values measured by 
a 4-point scale (1 for “healthy” firms, 2 for “balanced” firms, 3 for “vulnerable firms” and 4 for 
“risky” firms). 
Panel A of Table 3 describes the maximum period, measured in working days, within 
which Greek listed firms are required to release their financial results. Year 2005 was a transition 
period due to the implementation of the IFRSs. For this specific year, there was an extension in 
the regulatory deadline for disclosing first and second quarter earnings results. A further 
extension was given for the release of annual results for 2006, 2007 and 2008.  
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Panel B of Table 3 displays the average number of working days which pass before 
annual and quarterly results are released. It is evident that, on average, our sample firms 
announce their earnings results some days earlier than the regulatory deadline. The average firm 
issues its annual and quarterly earnings announcements slightly more than 30 calendar days after 
its fiscal year-end. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.2 Methodology 
To assess the market reaction to earnings announcements, we use the classical event study 
methodology, whereby we define the event day (t = 0) as the day of disclosure of a firm’s 
earnings results. We use an estimation window of three days (-1, 0 and +1) consisting of the day 
immediately before and immediately after the event day (inclusive) to capture the market 
reaction to the disclosure, since the market reaction to earnings announcements occurs over a 
short time span. The use of an event period longer than three days has the consequence of 
normalizing or reducing the effect of the release of earnings announcements that we intend to 
capture. 
 The effect of new information on the value of a given equity stock, i, is measured by the 
difference between the actual return on day t, Ri,t, and the expected return on that day, E(Ri,t). 
This difference is called abnormal return, ARi,t, and is given as: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t)            (1) 
The expected return can be derived from estimating the market model as: 
, ,
( ) *
i t m t
E R a R                  (2) 
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where: ,m tR  is the return on the market portfolio on day t and serves as a proxy for the ASE 
General Index (ASEI), and α and β are the Ordinary Least-Squares parameters using the 200 
daily returns data7 prior to the event window. Chung and Lee (1998) and Kim et al. (1997) also 
used 200 daily returns data to estimate α and β in their market model in order to compute market 
reaction to earnings announcements. 
To investigate the effect of annual and quarterly (interim) earnings announcements across 
the event period, we compute average abnormal returns (AAR) for all firm portfolios using the 
formula below: 
  AARp,t = 
N
AR
1
,

N
t
ti
            (4) 
where: ,i tAR  is the actual abnormal return for earnings announcement firms and N is the number 
of observations in a portfolio. We also compute cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
for the three-day event period as follows: 
  CAAR (t-1 –t+1) = 

t
tt
t
2
1
AAR            (5) 
To investigate the timeliness of the earnings announcements of Greek listed firms, we 
define the reporting lag of earnings announcements as the number of working days from the 
begging of the period (either annual or quarterly) to the actual date of the announcement. To this 
end, we follow Chen et al. (2005) by forming an announcement timing index (ATI) to proxy the 
reporting lag, which is defined as ATI = n/N, where: n is the nth first working day after firms are 
required by the regulatory agency to announce earnings (i.e., January 2 for annual earnings 
announcements, April 1 for first quarter, July 1 for second quarter, and September 1 for third 
quarter); and N is the total number of working days in the regulatory interval for earnings 
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announcements, depending on whether the announcement is for annual or quarterly earnings 
(i.e., January 2 to March 31 for annual earnings announcement, April 1 to May 31 for first 
quarter, July 1 to August 31 for second quarter, and September 1 to November 30 for third 
quarter). 
Furthermore, we assess whether firms that experience positive unexpected earnings 
changes expedite their disclosure of earnings, while those that exhibit negative unexpected 
earnings changes delay their earnings announcements. Using the random walk model8, we define 
unexpected earnings changes (UE) as the difference between a firm’s current year earnings (Ei,t) 
and its previous year earnings (Ei,t-1), which could be positive or negative. Thus: 
  UE = Ei,t – Ei,t-1            (6) 
The unexpected earnings change is positive if , , 1i t i tE E  , neutral if , , 1i t i tE E  , and negative if 
, , 1i t i tE E  . 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Timeliness of Earnings Announcements and Stock Price Reaction 
As mentioned earlier, the HCMC requires that all ASE-listed firms disclose both their annual and 
quarterly earnings during a pre-determined time interval. Panel A of Table 4 displays the results 
from the full sample of earnings announcements. We observe that the disclosure of financial 
results provokes a weak positive abnormal return of 0.036% on day 0. The CAAR for three days 
is -0.100% and not statistically significant at any conventional level. These results demonstrate 
that earnings announcements are not informative per se. However, when splitting the full sample 
of earnings announcements according to the content conveyed (positive vs. negative earnings 
changes), we find support for Hypothesis 1. In particular, financial disclosures with “good 
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content” produce significant excess returns on day 0 of 0.323% (t = 2.89) and a CAAR of the 
three days of 0.492% (t = 2.54). On the other hand, firms that announce negative unexpected 
earnings undergo price losses of -0.217% on day 0 and of -0.623% over the three days 
surrounding the announcement date (t = -2.63). The above results confirm the findings of prior 
studies that the information contained in financial results is the key driver of stock price 
variations surrounding the announcement date. 
Another aspect of financial disclosures that has been widely explored in the past is 
timeliness. In this study we examine the impact of timeliness on the information content of 
earnings announcements, initially isolating the effect of the earnings component and then 
incorporating it into our analysis. Panel B of Table 4 displays the results for the timeliness of the 
earnings announcements analysis. To assess timeliness we use the mean announcement date, 
which is calculated by averaging across firms the number of days that elapse between the first 
day that financial disclosure is permitted (e.g., January 2 for annual results) and the actual 
earnings announcement date. We find that the earliest announcements exhibit statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns on day 0 of 0.415% (t = 3.66), while the latest announcers 
experience abnormal returns of -0.088%, though not statistically significant (t = -1.18).  
We further examine the value relevance of the timeliness of earnings announcements 
considering the unexpected earnings component. The results show that firms announcing positive 
unexpected earnings before the mean announcement date experience a strong abnormal return on 
day 0 of 0.714%, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, we find no 
statistically significant market reaction when firms announce negative unexpected earnings 
(0.057% on day 0), which suggests that early-announcing firms presenting negative news do not 
undergo significant price losses. Firms that announce positive unexpected earnings after the 
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mean announcement date earn positive abnormal returns of 0.155% on day 0 which is, however, 
less in magnitude compared to firms that announce their earnings early (0.714%). The market 
reaction is strong in cases where earnings are released late and contain “bad news”. In these 
cases the abnormal return on day 0 is -0.283% and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
To probe deeper into the effects of timeliness on earnings releases, we split the sample 
along the regulatory deadline. Panel C of Table 4 presents the results for the timeliness of all 
quarterly announcements according to the regulatory deadline (fiscal quarter-end). Firms 
releasing earnings reports before the regulatory deadline earn significant abnormal returns on day 
0 of 0.237% (t = 3.29). On the other hand, firms that delay the release of earnings reports until 
the last day (the regulatory deadline) experience significant negative abnormal returns on day 0 
of -0.378% (t = -3.11). Moreover, firms that accelerate the announcement of earnings with 
favorable content experience a statistically significant abnormal return of 0.555% on day 0 (t = 
5.71), while those that delay the announcement of earnings with unfavorable content until the 
last day undergo a statistically significant abnormal return of -0.484% (t = -3.01). Overall, these 
results suggest that the timeliness of earnings announcements per se can produce a significant 
market reaction. However, the role of timeliness grows stronger depending on the content of the 
financial results. In cases of early announcements the “good” content of earnings drives up stock 
prices, while in cases of delayed announcements the “bad” content of earnings drives stock 
prices down. The two effects of timeliness and earnings content are cancelled out in cases of 
“early bad” and “late good” announcements, sending a neutral signal to the market. Collectively, 
the above results lend support to the “good news early, bad news late” hypothesis.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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4.2 Informativeness of Credit Ratings 
While prior empirical evidence suggests that credit ratings reduce information asymmetry and 
affect corporate profitability (An and Chan, 2008), we investigate whether credit ratings enhance 
the informativeness of financial reports. Table 5 presents the results from the effect of credit 
ratings on the information content of earnings announcements. For the group of “healthy” firms, 
we find a positive market reaction of 0.126% on the announcement date, although this is not 
statistically significant (t = 0.79). When we relate credit ratings with the unexpected component 
of earnings, we observe that the information content of earnings reports changes. In particular, 
for the group of “healthy” firms, positive unexpected earnings produce strong positive abnormal 
returns of 0.503% on the announcement date (t = 2.55) and a CAAR of three days of 0.453% (t = 
1.33). In contrast, negative unexpected earnings provoke share price losses of -0.260% (t = -
1.10) and a CAAR of three days of -0.777% (t = -1.90). 
The group of “balanced” firms exhibits insignificant returns around earnings releases 
(0.090% on day 0), which implies that the credit ratings for this group send a neutral signal to the 
market. However, when we consider the interaction of unexpected earnings changes and credit 
ratings for this group of firms, we find significant positive abnormal returns in the case of 
positive unexpected earnings (0.430% on day 0 and 0.919% over three days), but a negative 
stock market reaction in the case of negative unexpected earnings (-0.220% on day 0 and -
0.629% over three days). These results suggest that firms from the “healthy” or “balanced” group 
generate a significant share price response to the earnings announcements during the three-day 
window, depending on the sign of earnings change (positive or negative). Therefore, for these 
two groups of firms the market places more emphasis on the financial report content rather than 
on credit ratings. 
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The group of “vulnerable” firms experience marginally significant negative CAARs of -
0.707% during the three-day window (t = 1.66). This negative reaction persists even in cases of 
positive earnings content for each of the three days of the event period. In fact, the CAAR of 
three days is -1.117%, statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Surprisingly, the market reaction 
is moderate in cases of negative earnings announcements (-0.158% on day 0 and a CAAR of -
0.378%). This result implies that the market might have already adjusted to the bad content of 
earnings announcements for this low-rated group of firms. The lowest-rated firms (“risky”) are 
generally those that are over borrowed, exposed to high interest expenses, have high debt and 
weak fundamentals. Therefore, regardless of the sign of the earnings release (positive or 
negative), credit ratings appear to determine the informativeness of financial statements. The 
market does not even perceive positive changes in earnings as an indicator of improvement in a 
“risky” firm’s financial standing. The market conceives such improvement as a temporary 
phenomenon. As a consequence, the reaction of the market is negative even in cases of positive 
unexpected earnings (-0.680% on day 0 and a CAAR of -2.881% for the three-day event period). 
In sum, our results suggest that credit ratings do explain the information content of 
earnings announcements. However, the role of credit ratings is magnified when earnings 
components are included in our analysis. In fact, the earnings sign is the main determinant of the 
market reaction to financial disclosures in the first two groups of credit ratings (i.e., “healthy” 
and “balanced”). However, the informational role of earnings content is mitigated for those firms 
belonging to the last two categories of credit quality (i.e., “vulnerable” and “risky”). For these 
two groups of firms, credit ratings appear to overshadow the information content in earnings 
releases. Thus, even when companies announce positive unexpected earnings they still 
experience market value losses. As an implication of the above results, we can assert that 
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managers should be concerned with increasing the overall creditworthiness of their firms rather 
than focusing on merely increasing profitability. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Additionally, we examine the joint effects of the timeliness of earnings announcements 
and the creditworthiness of firms on the information content of earnings. In their theoretical 
work, Boot et al. (2006) demonstrated that credit ratings agencies compile credible private and 
public information which speeds up the dissemination of private information to the market. An 
and Chan (2008) argued that high credit ratings help firms to announce corporate news in a 
timely manner, since high creditworthiness reduces information asymmetry through the 
dissemination of important information to uninformed investors. Aman and Nguyen (2013) 
showed that the extent and timeliness of information disclosures are associated with higher credit 
ratings. This can be attributed to investor interest in better-quality and well-timed information 
which reduces risk and uncertainty and which is then reflected by better credit ratings. 
Contrarily, a longer time between the fiscal closing date and the release of financial reports can 
be linked to lower credit ratings, since the delay in disseminating information is considered as an 
attempt to conceal unfavorable news until this becomes unavoidable. We therefore expect credit 
ratings, in association with timeliness, to exert a combined effect on the information content of 
financial accounts. 
The results from the interrelation between credit quality and timely earnings 
announcements are reported in Table 6. We observe that “healthy” firms enjoy positive (though 
statistically insignificant) abnormal returns regardless of the timing of the announcement. 
Specifically, “healthy” firms that are early (late) announcers elicit an abnormal return of 0.252% 
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(0.085%) on the announcement date. This result implies that the market might have already 
incorporated the “good” content of the financial reports of high-rated firms. However, when the 
earnings component is taken into account, the results show a significant market reaction for both 
early and late announcers with positive earnings content (0.445% and 0.578%, respectively). The 
market reaction is negative in the case of firms which delay announcing “bad” news (-0.369%).  
Interestingly, the results for “balanced” firms show that the market applauds early 
earnings announcements by producing an excess return of 0.409% on day 0 (t = 2.86) and a 
CAAR of 0.850% during the three-day event period (t = 3.98). Contrarily, late announcing firms 
undergo mild price reductions during the three-day period surrounding the announcement date 
(CAAR of -0.154%). As in the “healthy” group, the sign of earnings magnifies the signal sent by 
“balanced” firms through earnings releases. Thus, early (late) announcers with positive earnings 
content receive strong abnormal returns of 0.751% (0.271%) on day 0, while those with negative 
content experience price reductions (-0.012% and -0.262% respectively). 
While “vulnerable” firms that release financial results early enjoy higher price 
appreciations of 0.848% on day 0, those that delay earnings announcements undergo significant 
share price losses of -0.378% on day 0. When taking into account the earnings component, we 
see a heterogeneous market reaction in contrast to the “balanced” group of firms. Late 
announcers with either good or bad earnings content experience significant share price losses of -
0.504% and -0.287%, respectively. This result implies that credit ratings overshadow the effect 
of the earnings content for the group of firms with low creditworthiness. Moreover, looking into 
the interrelationship between timeliness and credit quality we observe a substitution effect. 
Specifically, the impact of timeliness gets stronger as credit quality deteriorates. For instance, 
timeliness seems to exert no effect on the information content of earnings in the highest-rated 
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firms. The market does not react to the firm being on time or delayed. For the “healthy” group of 
firms, the earnings component is the key driver of market reaction. As the credit quality worsens, 
timeliness appears to some extent to determine the market reaction to earnings releases. In other 
words, for the low-rated group of firms9, timeliness could serve as the best channel for 
transmitting important corporate information to investors. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The results of the analysis investigating the impact of changes in credit ratings on 
earnings announcements are reported in Table 7. We identify 364 cases of credit rating upgrades 
and 428 cases of credit rating downgrades during the examined period. Following Jorion et al. 
(2005), we convert credit ratings into cardinal variables measured on a 4-point scale (1 for 
“healthy” firms, 2 for “balanced” firms, 3 for “vulnerable firms” and 4 for “risky” firms). We 
also identify two main credit rating gradation types: “within” and “across”. The “within” type 
occurs when a firm’s credit rating changes within the same band of ratings, i.e. a change from A 
to AA or vice versa. In contrast, the “across” type occurs when a firm’s credit rating changes 
between different band of ratings (i.e., a change from A to B or vice versa). 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that credit rating upgrades provoke a non-significant market 
reaction on day 0 of 0.211%. However, when credit rating upgrades are taken into account 
together with positive unexpected earnings, we observe significant share price appreciations on 
day 0 of 0.433%, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The market reaction becomes 
stronger when the upgrade is an “across” type (0.586% on day 0) vis-à-vis a “within” type 
(0.403% on day 0). These results imply that the information content of earnings is magnified 
when the change in credit ratings is an upgrade. In other words, the market rewards positive 
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earnings releases when they are associated with notable credit rating upgrades. On the other 
hand, the combination of credit rating upgrades and negative unexpected earnings is associated 
with a non-significant market reaction on day 0 (-0.002% on day 0). Moreover, neither the 
“within” nor the “across” type excite the market in any way. These results imply that credit 
upgrading is offset by the negative content of earnings releases. 
Panel B of Table 7 documents the effect of credit rating downgrades on earnings 
announcements. Unlike the results from credit rating upgrades, credit rating downgrades bring 
about a significant share price erosion during the three-day event period (CAAR of -0.580%). 
This result is consistent with prior research which suggests that the market reacts significantly to 
downgrades (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand et al., 1992; Goh and Ederington, 1993; 
Jorion et al., 2005). However, when credit rating downgrades interact with the sign of the change 
in earnings releases, the results change considerably. Specifically, the information content of 
positive earnings releases is eliminated when the credit rating of the announcing firm 
deteriorates. In fact, this result is comparable to that of the negative earnings releases and credit 
rating upgrades reported earlier. On the other hand, when credit rating downgrades are associated 
with bad earnings releases, this produces significant market value losses. Specifically, the 
combination of credit rating downgrades and negative earnings results brings about a -0.468% 
reaction on day 0. This negative market reaction is slightly higher when the downgrading is of 
the “across” type (-0.489% on day 0) as opposed to the “within” type (-0.483% on day 0). The 
above results partly support the proposition that changes in credit ratings reveal private 
information regarding a firm’s value, and that credit rating upgrades (downgrades) are decoded 
positively (negatively) by the market when they are associated with positive (negative) 
unexpected earnings releases. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
We perform a multivariate regression analysis to check the validity of the results already 
reported. Specifically, we estimate the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression, which is immune to 
problems of cross-sectional dependence (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001), to detect the factors that 
affect the information content of earnings. In this analysis, we use either the average abnormal 
return (AAR) of earnings announcements on day 0 or the cumulative average abnormal return of 
three days (CAAR) of the full sample as the dependent variable and we control for: (i) the credit 
ratings level (Cardinal) that takes the value of 1 for “healthy” firms, 2 for “balanced” firms, 3 for 
“vulnerable” firms and 4 for “risky” firms; (ii) the unexpected earnings change (∆UE) that takes 
the value of 1 for a positive unexpected change and 0 otherwise; (iii) the timeliness variable 
(Timeliness) that takes the value of 1 for announcements before the regulatory deadline and 0 
otherwise; (iv) the interaction between credit ratings and change in unexpected earnings 
(Cardinal*∆UE); (v) the interaction between timeliness and change in unexpected earnings 
(Timeliness*∆UE); and (vi) the interaction between credit ratings and timeliness 
(Cardinal*Timeliness). 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for the analysis investigating the determinants of 
abnormal returns on earnings announcements. The coefficient of Cardinal is negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This result implies that the higher the cardinal value (i.e. 
the lower the credit quality), the lower the market reaction to earnings releases. As expected, the 
coefficient of unexpected earnings change (ΔUE) is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. This result is consistent with our earlier results, suggesting that the sign of earnings 
change has a strong impact on earnings announcements. In addition, timeliness has a positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient at the 0.05 level. This result corroborates findings from prior 
research which suggest that the market reacts strongly to earnings reports that are released to the 
public early. Furthermore, the results show that the interactive term between timeliness and 
unexpected earnings change (Timeliness*∆UE) positively affects the informational component 
of earnings, lending support to the “good news early, bad news late” hypothesis. However, the 
interaction between cardinal and unexpected earnings change and also the interaction between 
cardinal and timeliness are statistically non-significant. Interestingly, the positive and significant 
interaction between cardinal and timeliness, when the CAAR of three days is the dependent 
variable, suggests that, as creditworthiness deteriorates (higher cardinal values), timeliness plays 
a more significant role in conveying news to the public. The above results corroborate the 
findings of Table 6 regarding the observed substitution effect between credit quality and 
timeliness. 
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results from the impact of credit rating upgrades and 
downgrades on the abnormal returns of earnings announcements. As before, we use either the 
average abnormal return (AAR) of earnings announcements on day 0 or the cumulative average 
abnormal return of the three-day event window (CAAR) as the dependent variable. Again, we 
control for: Cardinal Size, which is the cardinal value of the new rating minus the cardinal value 
of the old rating; unexpected earnings change (∆UE) which takes the value of 1 for a positive 
unexpected change and 0 otherwise; and credit rating change (∆CR) which takes the value of 1 
for a credit rating upgrade and 0 otherwise. The results show that the coefficients of both 
unexpected earnings change (∆UE) and credit ratings change (∆CR) positively and significantly 
affect the market on earnings announcement dates. Cardinal Size seems not to significantly affect 
the market reaction. Overall, our findings suggest that the content of earnings releases, the time-
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lag of earnings dissemination and the creditworthiness of firms are all significantly associated 
with the informativeness of earnings announcements. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Tests 
To confirm the robustness of our results, we conduct three additional tests. First, we re-run the 
tests using the market-adjusted returns model (see Brown and Warner, 1985) to compute the 
abnormal share price reaction surrounding earnings announcement dates. Untabulated results 
show that the mean abnormal return on day 0 is 0.482% for firms announcing earnings reports 
before the mean announcement date and -0.214% for those announcing their earnings late. When 
firms announce positive (negative) unexpected earnings we observe a statistically significant 
abnormal return of 0.793% (0.112%) for early announcers on day 0. Late announcers experience 
an abnormal return of -0.082% when disclosing unexpected positive earnings and -0.320% when 
disclosing negative financial results. “Healthy” firms that announce positive (negative) financial 
results experience significant abnormal returns of 0.458% (-0.431%) on the announcement date. 
“Balanced” firms that announce positive (negative) financial results experience significant 
abnormal returns of 0.374% (-0.337%) on the announcement date. “Vulnerable” firms that 
disclose positive (negative) financial results experience significant price erosions of -1.535% (-
1.567%) over the three-day announcement period. Finally, “risky” firms that announce positive 
(negative) financial results experience insignificant abnormal returns of -0.750% (-0.880%) on 
the announcement date. 
Second, we re-assess the share price behavior based on the sign of the earnings figure 
(i.e. positive earnings versus negative earnings) in lieu of unexpected earnings changes. The 
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results demonstrate significant share price appreciations of 0.262% on day 0 for firms 
experiencing positive earnings and -0.563% for those announcing negative earnings. The same 
share price pattern is recorded in all categories of firms (i.e., “healthy”, “balanced”, “vulnerable” 
and “risky”). Third, we re-run the regressions by using earnings figures in lieu of unexpected 
earnings as a control variable. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 8. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of timeliness and credit ratings on the information content of 
earnings announcements by employing data from the Greek stock market. The adoption of 
European directives (e.g., Transparency Directive No. 2004/109/EC) and regulatory reforms 
(such as the application of IFRSs and the establishment of ELTE, a new accounting oversight 
board) were aimed at improving the quality of financial reporting. However, lack of enforcement 
(Christensen et al., 2012) has resulted in marginal benefits (see Garcia-Osma and Pope, 2011). 
Thus, timely information is important in mitigating asymmetries, leaks and rumors (Owusu-
Ansah, 2000). Additionally, in such markets investors often follow “credible” channels of 
information such as credit ratings which sometimes leads to herding behavior (Economou et al., 
2011). While the role of credit ratings in bond markets has been well-examined, the employment 
of credit ratings in equity markets remains under-researched. We therefore examine the impact of 
both timeliness and credit ratings on corporate earnings announcements. 
Our results show that the timeliness of earnings announcements is indeed value relevant. 
In particular, we find evidence of a significant share price appreciation for firms that make their 
financial statements available to the public earlier than the regulatory deadline. The 
informativeness of earnings becomes stronger when the early announcements contain positive 
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earnings news. The results for the analysis investigating the role of credit ratings indicate that the 
level of credit quality strengthens the value relevance of earnings announcements, especially 
when combined with the sign of earnings figures. When considering the interrelation between 
credit ratings and timeliness, we detect an interesting substitution effect between these two 
conduits of corporate information. In essence, the role of timeliness in determining the 
informational content of earnings results increases as the credit quality deteriorates. Finally, we 
find a heterogeneous market reaction to earnings announcements when they are associated with 
credit rating upgrades and downgrades. On the one hand, credit rating downgrades provoke a 
stronger market reaction compared to upgrades, especially when changes in credit ratings are in 
the same direction with earnings changes (i.e. upgrades with positive earnings, downgrades with 
negative earnings). On the other hand, when changes in credit ratings move in the opposite 
direction to changes in earnings results, we observe no abnormal returns. This implies that the 
two contradictory changes almost outweigh the information content of financial results. 
Our study provides several contributions to the ongoing debate about earnings 
announcements. Firstly, we extend prior research by offering evidence regarding the impact of 
credit ratings on the informational role of financial reports. We provide new evidence about the 
role of credit ratings in transmitting credible information to investors and shareholders alike. 
Secondly, this is the first study that tests the role of timeliness in association with credit ratings. 
This allows us to investigate possible concurrent or opposing effects between the two sources of 
share price variation. Our results show that the two sources are involved in a substitution rather 
than a complementary effect. Thirdly, given the scant evidence regarding the role that credit 
ratings play in equity markets, the current study sheds light on the importance of credit ratings as 
an alternative conduit of information for both informed and uninformed investors. 
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Our results have several implications. From a practical point of view, our analysis could 
be of interest to those who invest in managerial-entrenched firms and seek ways to increase their 
wealth. The results also demonstrate that, although financial reports might be informative, they 
are subject to criticism of low financial reporting quality. Moreover, our results might be useful 
to corporate managers who implement measures to improve their firm’s credit ratings. Credit 
ratings seem to constitute alternative channels for corporate information in cases where corporate 
news such as earnings announcements “obscure” content from the public. For investors, the 
employment of credit ratings provides useful insights into how these can be applied to equity 
markets in order to assess corporate information. 
The study has several limitations. First, we do not test for the effects of certain variables 
that have been found to be significant in explaining variations in earnings information, such as 
industry clustering, intangible intensity and earnings persistence. Second, due to the lack of data 
on credit ratings for firms in the financial sector, we could not include such firms in our analysis. 
Third, due to data unavailability regarding financial analyst earnings forecasts in Greece, we are 
not able to calculate the unexpected earnings as the difference between actual earnings per share 
minus the mean analyst consensus forecast. The results and limitations of the study provide 
avenues for further research. 
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Endnotes 
1. In a famous case, the ratings for the now defunct Enron remained at investment grade four 
days before it went bankrupt, despite the fact that credit rating agencies had been well aware 
of its problems for months (Borrus, 2002). 
2. For example, there have been press releases concerning EADS, the parent company of the 
Airbus jet manufacturer, about postponing the news of delayed delivery of the new A380 
jetliner from April 2006 to June 2006. This caused severe criticism of the managers which, in 
turn, led EADS to lose a quarter of its value (Kothari et al., 2009). For further examples and 
evidence see Burns and Kedia (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005). 
3. Jiang (2008) probed into the causal effect of earnings on the cost of debt as proxied by credit 
ratings, but not the reverse effect. 
4. We use credit rating data from Amadeus, one of the leading credit rating agencies on 
corporate creditworthiness in Europe. 
5. According to Brown and Warner (1985), the non-synchronous trading problem may result in 
biased estimates of market model parameters. 
6. Results remain similar at different thresholds (e.g., 1% and 2%). 
7. According to Bartholdy et al. (2007), the standard estimation period for thin markets is 
between 200 and 250 observations (i.e., about a year of trading prior to the three-day event 
period). 
8. An alternative way of calculating unexpected earnings changes is to use the consensus of 
financial analyst forecasts as a benchmark (the expected earnings). However, financial 
analyst forecasts were available for only a very limited number of Greek listed firms. 
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9. The number of firms belonging to the “risky” group is profoundly smaller compared to 
the other groups and, for this reason, solid conclusions could not be reached. Moreover, 
we cannot identify early announcing firms for this group of firms. 
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Table 1. Description of credit rating categories 
   
Category Rating Risk Assessment 
   
Healthy 
firms 
 
AAA 
The firm’s capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely 
strong. The firm shows an excellent economic and financial flow 
and fund equilibrium. 
AA 
The firm has a strong creditworthiness. It also has a good capital 
structure and economic and financial equilibrium. Difference from 
“AAA” is slight. 
A 
The firm has a high solvency. The firm is, however, more 
susceptible to the adverse effect of changes in circumstances and 
economic conditions than firms in higher rated categories. 
Balanced 
firms 
 
BBB 
Capital structure and economic equilibrium are considered adequate. 
The firm’s capacity to meet its financial commitments could be 
affected by serious unfavorable events. 
BB 
A firm rated “BB” is more vulnerable than companies rated “BBB”. 
Furthermore, the firm faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure 
to adverse business, financial or economic conditions. 
Vulnerable 
firms 
 
B 
The firm presents vulnerable signals with regard to its fundamentals. 
Adverse business, financial or economic conditions will be likely to 
impair the firm’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial 
commitments. 
CCC 
A firm rated “CCC” has a dangerous disequilibrium in the capital 
structure and in its economic and financial fundamentals There is a 
high probability that adverse market events and inadequate 
management could affect the firm’s solvency. 
Risky 
firms 
 
CC 
The firm shows signs of high vulnerability. In the event of adverse 
market and economic conditions, the firm’s strong disequilibrium 
could increase. 
C 
The firm shows considerable pathological situations. The firm’s 
capacity to meet its financial commitment is very low. 
D 
The firm no longer has the capacity to meet its financial 
commitments. 
Note: The Multi Objective Rating Evaluation (MORE) model is essentially used to determine the level of distress of 
industrial firms by using data included in financial statements. 
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Table 2. Distribution of earnings announcement dates per time year and rating category 
 
Panel A: No. of earnings announcements per quarterly interval 
Year 
Annual 
(4th Quarter) 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter Total 
2001     5     2     0     0        7 
2002   15     5     9   11      40 
2003   48   29   28   36    141 
2004   53   48   35   29    165 
2005   81   54   57   49    241 
2006 117 101   99 103    420 
2007 106 169 174 161    610 
2008 210 211 200 198    819 
Total 635 619 602 587 2,443 
      
Panel B: No. of earnings announcements per credit rating category 
Year “Healthy” Firms “Balanced” Firms “Vulnerable” Firms “Risky” Firms Total 
2001     3        4     0   0        7 
2002     7      32     1   0      40 
2003   19      97   22   2    141 
2004   39      95   26   5    165 
2005   61    147   33   0    241 
2006   56    296   62   6    420 
2007   64    438   96 16    610 
2008   98    551 148 22    819 
Total 347 1,660 384 52 2,443 
      
Panel C: Earnings announcements per credit rating changes 
 Upgrades  Downgrades 
Year No. Cardinal Size  No. Cardinal Size 
2001     0 0.00      0 0.00 
2002     3 1.00      0 0.00 
2003     4 1.00    21 1.14 
2004   18 1.17    26 1.08 
2005   40 1.25    30 1.10 
2006   56 1.00    76 1.11 
2007 109 1.21  125 1.30 
2008 134 1.28  150 1.15 
Total 364   428  
Notes: “Healthy” firms are those with credit ratings between A and AAA, “Balanced” firms have credit ratings 
between BB and BBB, “Vulnerable” firms are those having credit ratings between CCC and B, and “Risky” firms 
are those with credit ratings between D and CC. Categorical credit ratings are converted into a cardinal variable 
measured on a 10-point scale (1 for a AAA rating, 2 for AA rating, etc.). The cardinal size is the difference between 
the cardinal value of a new rating and that of an old rating. 
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Table 3. The average and maximum number of days before releasing financial results 
Panel A: The maximum number of working days before releasing financial results 
Year 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th quarter 
2001 41 44 45 40 
2002 40 44 43 42 
2003 39 43 42 41 
2004 40 43 42 39 
2005 62 65 42 40 
2006 38 43 44 63 
2007 40 44 45 63 
2008 41 43 42 58 
     Panel B: The average number of working days before releasing financial results 
Year 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th quarter 
2001 30 n/a n/a 37 
2002 27 39 38 38 
2003 34 37 35 39 
2004 34 33 34 37 
2005 54 54 36 37 
2006 33 37 37 53 
2007 35 38 39 52 
2008 37 39 38 53 
 
Notes: The maximum number of working days to pass before releasing financial results are determined by Greek 
corporate law. Year 2005 was a transitional year (the implementation of the IFRS) for releasing annual and first-
quarter financial results. n/a = non-available.
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Table 4. Abnormal returns around earnings announcements dates 
 
 
        
Panel A: Announcements by sign of earnings Obs. Day -1 t-student  Day 0 t-student Day +1 t-student CAAR (-1, +1) t-student 
Full sample 2,443 -0.004 -0.04  0.036  0.33 -0.132 -1.22  -0.100 -0.53 
Full sample: positive unexpected earnings 1,145 0.051  0.46  0.323***  2.89  0.118  1.06   0.492**  2.54 
Full sample: negative unexpected earnings 1,298   -0.053 -0.39 -0.217 -1.59 -0.353*** -2.58  -0.623*** -2.63 
 
 
        
Panel B: Announcements by mean announcement date          
Before mean announcement date    587  0.166  1.53  0.415*** 3.66  0.031  0.25  0.613***  3.18 
Before mean announcement date: positive unexpected earnings    320  0.341**  2.41  0.714*** 4.85  0.300*  1.95  1.355***  4.27 
Before mean announcement date: negative unexpected earnings    267 -0.043 -0.26  0.057 0.33 -0.291 -1.40 -0.276 -1.14 
          
After mean announcement date 1,818 -0.059 -0.88 -0.088 -1.18 -0.205*** -2.59 -0.352 -1.51 
After mean announcement date: positive unexpected earnings    809 -0.085 -0.88  0.155 1.42   0.034  0.28  0.104  0.47 
After mean announcement date: negative unexpected earnings 1,009 -0.037 -0.40 -0.283*** -2.77 -0.398*** -3.82 -0.718** -2.38 
 
 
        
Panel C: Announcements by regulatory deadline          
Before regulatory deadline 1,599  0.064  0.95  0.237*** 3.29 -0.167**  2.19  0.134  0.81 
Before regulatory deadline: positive unexpected earnings    784  0.149  1.60  0.555*** 5.71  0.160  1.49  0.864***  3.95 
Before regulatory deadline: negative unexpected earnings    815 -0.018 -0.19 -0.070 -0.67 -0.481*** -4.50 -0.569** -2.32 
 
 
        
On regulatory deadline    805 -0.140 -1.32 -0.378*** -3.11 -0.106 -0.79 -0.624 -1.52 
On regulatory deadline: positive unexpected earnings    345 -0.222 -1.42 -0.237 -1.27 -0.004 -0.02 -0.463 -1.02 
On regulatory deadline: negative unexpected earnings    460 -0.079 -0.54 -0.484*** -3.01 -0.182  1.04 -0.744 -0.01 
Notes: The mean announcement date is calculated by averaging across firms the number of days that elapse between the first day that financial disclosure is permitted and the 
actual date of announcement. Regulatory deadline is defined as the ultimate date of announcement by law. The regulatory deadline is March 31 of the next year for annual 
results, May 31 for the first quarter, June 30 for semi-annual results, and November 30 for the third quarter results. Abnormal returns are computed using the market model 
and unexpected earnings are calculated using the random walk model. We define the event period of announcement as the three days surrounding the announcement day 
(days -1, 0 and +1). Market model parameters (α and β) were estimated using 200 daily returns data prior to the event window. 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Abnormal returns of earnings announcements by credit ratings 
 
 
        
  Obs. Day -1 t-student Day 0 t-student  Day +1 t-student CAAR (-1, +1) t-student 
 
 
        
Healthy firms    346  0.076  0.48  0.126  0.79 -0.357** -2.22 -0.154 -0.56 
Healthy firms: positive unexpected earnings   175  0.117  0.59  0.503**  2.55 -0.167 -0.85  0.453  1.33 
Healthy firms: negative unexpected earnings   171  0.035  0.15 -0.260 -1.10  -0.551** -2.34 -0.777* -1.90 
 
 
        
Balanced firms 1,661  0.008  0.08  0.090  0.83  0.011  0.10  0.109  0.58 
Balanced firms: positive unexpected earnings   792  0.097  0.80  0.430***  3.56  0.392***  3.24  0.919***  4.39 
Balanced firms: negative unexpected earnings   869 -0.073 -0.53 -0.220 -1.59 -0.337** -2.43 -0.629*** -2.63 
 
 
        
Vulnerable firms   384 -0.053 -0.22 -0.211 -0.86 -0.443* -1.80 -0.707* -1.66 
Vulnerable firms: positive unexpected earnings   158 -0.120 -0.41 -0.287 -0.99 -0.771*** -2.65 -1.117** -2.34 
Vulnerable firms: negative unexpected earnings   226  0.006 -0.02 -0.158 -0.48 -0.213 -0.64 -0.378 -0.89 
 
 
        
Risky firms     52 -0.586 -0.76 -0.465 -0.60 -0.897 -1.16 -1.947 -1.45 
Risky firms: positive unexpected earnings     20 -0.994 -0.76 -0.680 -0.52 -1.208 -0.93 -2.881 -1.27 
Risky firms: negative unexpected earnings     32 -0.331 -0.37 -0.330 -0.37 -0.702 -0.78 -1.363 -0.88 
Notes: “Healthy” firms are those with credit ratings between A and AAA, “Balanced” firms have credit ratings between BB and BBB, “Vulnerable” firms are those having 
credit ratings between CCC and B, and “Risky” firms are those with credit ratings between D and CC. Abnormal returns are computed using the market model. Unexpected 
earnings changes are computed using the random walk model. We define the event period of announcement as the three days surrounding the announcement day (days -1, 0 
and +1). Market model parameters (α and β) were estimated using 200 daily returns data prior to the event window. 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6. Abnormal returns of earnings announcements by credit ratings, timeliness and unexpected earnings 
  Obs. Day -1 t-student Day 0 t-student Day +1 t-student CAAR (-1, +1) t-student 
Healthy firms           
Before mean announcement date 118   0.114   0.53   0.252 1.33 -0.845*** -3.35  -0.480 -1.04 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 67   0.364 1.44   0.445* 1.85 -0.554** -2.04   0.255  0.48 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 51 -0.215 -0.58  -0.002 -0.01 -1.228*** -2.67 -1.445* -1.83 
After mean announcement date 219   0.089   0.60   0.085 0.48 -0.112 -0.63   0.062   0.21 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 105 -0.041 -0.20   0.578** 2.04  0.051 0.19   0.588 1.40 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 114 0.208  0.96  -0.369* -1.70 -0.262 -1.09  -0.423 -1.03 
 
 
        
Balanced firms          
Before mean announcement date 420   0.140   1.07  0.409*** 2.86  0.301* 1.96   0.850***       3.98 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 232   0.264  1.57  0.751*** 4.12  0.626*** 3.33   1.640*** 4.38 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 188 -0.012 -0.06 -0.012 -0.05 -0.100 -0.40  -0.124 -0.57 
After mean announcement date 1,217 -0.040 -0.50 -0.023 -0.26 -0.092 -1.00  -0.154 -0.72 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 547 -0.004 -0.04    0.271**  2.26  0.286**  2.05   0.552** 2.55 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 670 -0.069 -0.63   -0.262** -2.13    -0.401*** -3.33  -0.731** -2.34 
          
Vulnerable firms          
Before mean announcement date 49   0.615  1.52   0.848** 2.22 -0.074 -0.19   1.389*   1.84 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 20  1.163 1.50   1.215* 1.81 -0.576 -1.02   1.802* 1.67 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 29 0.209 0.52  -0.577** -2.29  0.297 0.54   -0.070 -0.07 
After mean announcement date 332 -0.153 -0.90  -0.378* -1.92 -0.587*** -2.77  -1.118*** -2.60 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 138 -0.306 -1.24  -0.504* -1.70 -0.799** -2.51  -1.609*** -2.64 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 194 -0.044 -0.19  -0.287 -1.10 -0.437 -1.54  -0.768** -1.97 
 
 
        
Risky firms          
After mean announcement date 49 -0.537 -0.71  -0.525 -0.65 -0.842 -0.99  -1.904 -1.11 
i) Positive unexpected earnings 19 -1.060 -0.71  -0.723 -0.46 -1.248 -0.74  -3.031 -1.18 
ii) Negative unexpected earnings 30 -0.217 -0.26  -0.404 -0.46 -0.593 -0.64  -1.213 -0.71 
Notes: “Healthy” firms are those with credit ratings between A and AAA, “Balanced” firms have credit ratings between BB and BBB, “Vulnerable” firms are those  
having credit ratings between CCC and B, and “Risky” firms are those with credit ratings between D and CC. Abnormal returns are computed using the market  
model. A mean announcement date is defined as the number of days that elapse between the quarter-end and the average date of announcement. Unexpected earnings  
changes are computed using the random walk model. We define the event period of announcement as the three days surrounding the announcement day (days -1, 0 and +1). 
Market model parameters (α and β) were estimated using 200 daily returns data prior to the event window. 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7. Credit rating changes and the information content of earnings announcements 
 
 
Panel A: Informational effect of credit rating upgrades 
  Obs. Day -1 t-student Day 0 t-student Day +1 t-student CAAR (-1, +1) t-student 
Credit rating upgrades 364 -0.144 -0.71  0.211  1.04 -0.115 -0.57 -0.049 -0.14 
Credit rating upgrades “within” type 304 -0.220 -1.02  0.118  0.55 -0.073 -0.34 -0.175 -0.47 
Credit rating upgrades “across” type   60  0.239  0.53  0.681  1.52 -0.329 -0.74  0.590  0.76 
  
 
        
Upgrades and positive unexpected earnings 178 -0.319 -1.48  0.433**  2.01  0.235  1.09  0.349  0.94 
Upgrades “within” type and positive unexpected earnings 149 -0.359 -1.58  0.403*  1.78  0.372 1.64  0.417  1.06 
Upgrades “across” type and positive unexpected earnings   29 -0.113 -0.19  0.586*  1.98 -0.472 -0.79  0.000  0.00 
  
 
        
Upgrades and negative unexpected earnings 186  0.022  0.08 -0.002  0.08 -0.450 -1.52 -0.429 -0.84 
Upgrades “within” type and negative unexpected earnings 155 -0.087 -0.26 -0.156 -0.47 -0.501 -1.51 -0.743 -1.29 
Upgrades “across” type and negative unexpected earnings   31  0.568  0.92  0.770  1.25 -0.196 -0.32  1.142  1.07 
  
 
        
Panel B: Informational effect of credit rating downgrades 
Credit rating downgrades 428 -0.045 -0.24 -0.278  1.49 -0.257 -1.37 -0.580* -1.79 
Credit rating downgrades “within” type 359 -0.053 -0.27 -0.295 -1.49 -0.227 -1.15 -0.575* -1.68 
Credit rating downgrades “across” type   69 -0.005 -0.01 -0.193 -0.40 -0.412 -0.86 -0.580 -0.70 
           
Downgrades and positive unexpected earnings 205 -0.128 -0.55 -0.072 -0.31 -0.467** -1.99 -0.668* -1.66 
Downgrades “within” type and positive unexpected earnings 171 -0.168 -0.64 -0.088 -0.33 -0.416 -1.58 -0.673 -1.47 
Downgrades “across” type and positive unexpected earnings   34  0.075  0.14  0.008  0.01 -0.726 -1.34 -0.643 -0.69 
  
 
        
Downgrades and negative unexpected earnings 223  0.031  0.11 -0.468* -1.72 -0.063 -0.23 -0.500 -1.06 
Downgrades “within” type and negative unexpected earnings 188  0.052  0.20 -0.483* -1.83 -0.054 -0.21 -0.485 -1.06 
Downgrades “across” type and negative unexpected earnings   35 -0.083 -0.10 -0.489* -1.89 -0.108 -0.14 -0.680 -1.42 
Notes: “Within” class indicates whether the credit rating change occurs within gradations of the same group of ratings (e.g. A, AA and AAA). “Across” class indicates 
changes in credit ratings that take place between different groups of firms (e.g. from “healthy” to “balanced”). Abnormal returns are computed using the market model and 
unexpected earnings are calculated using the random walk model. We define the event period of announcement as the three days surrounding the announcement day (days -1, 
0 and +1). Market model parameters (α and β) were estimated using 200 daily returns data prior to the event window. 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Regression analysis 
 
 
Panel A: Results for determinants of abnormal returns on earnings announcements 
 
Model: AAR (CAAR) = β0 + β1Cardinal + β2ΔUE + β3Timeliness + β4Cardinal*ΔUE + 
β5Timeliness*ΔUE + β6 Cardinal*Timeliness + Ɛ                                                                      (1) 
 
 AAR  CAAR 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  0.007 1.57  0.023*** 2.98 
Cardinal      -0.002**     -2.52     -0.006***      -3.92 
ΔUE  0.001**      2.18  0.001** 2.54 
Timeliness  0.002** 2.40  0.018* 1.92 
Cardinal*ΔUE      -0.001     -1.16     -0.001      -0.62 
Timeliness*ΔUE 0.001* 1.67  0.001 0.78 
Cardinal*Timeliness 0.002 1.45  0.005*** 2.62 
      
No. of obs. 2,404  2,404 
F-statistic     5.67***      4.55*** 
Adjusted R2                    0.11                      0.09 
    
Panel B: Results for assessing credit rating upgrades and downgrades on earnings 
announcements 
 
Model: AAR (CAAR) = α0 + α1Cardinal Size + α2ΔUE + α3∆CR + Ɛ                                         (2) 
 
 AAR  CAAR 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.006* -1.68  -0.006 -0.12 
Cardinal Size   0.001   0.44  -0.004 -0.74 
∆UE   0.005**   2.06    0.003*   1.71 
∆CR   0.004*   1.74    0.005**   2.22 
      
No. of obs. 792  792 
F-statistic 2.46  1.95 
Adjusted R2 0.06  0.01 
Notes: Regression analysis is performed using the OLS with White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity–consistent standard 
errors. The dependent variable is either the average abnormal return on the earnings announcement day (AAR) or the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of the three days around the earnings announcement date (CAAR). The 
independent variables are: the unexpected earnings change (∆UE) that takes the value of 1 for a positive unexpected 
change and 0 otherwise; the timeliness dummy (Timeliness) that takes a value of 1 for announcements before the 
regulatory deadline and 0 otherwise; and the credit ratings level (Cardinal) that takes a value of 1 for “healthy” firms, 2 
for “balanced” firms, 3 for “vulnerable” firms and 4 for “risky” firms. Cardinal*ΔUE is an interaction between credit 
ratings and change in unexpected earnings. Timeliness*UE is an interaction between timeliness and change in 
unexpected earnings. Cardinal*Timeliness is an interaction between credit ratings and timeliness. Cardinal Size of 
rating changes is the cardinal value of the new rating minus the cardinal value of the old rating. Credit rating change 
(ΔCR) takes the value of 1 for a credit rating upgrade and 0 otherwise. 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
